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In the early nineteenth Century, Shaka Zulu was able to create a 
po werf ul kingdom in the east of modern South Africa. In so 
doing, this new Zulu king took over the powers of the lower 
Chiefs and the ideological position as "father" of their people. He 
became responsible for the well-being of his subjects, and for the 
redistribution of agricultural production. Moreover, as a king, he 
was the symbol of the people's unity. 
Shaka's successors managed to hold the kingdom together 
until 1879, when the Zulu were conquered by the British and 
their guns. In the reorganisation after the conquest, the Zulu 
kings lost most of their powers. When king Dinuzulu died in 
1913, his successor, Solomon ka Dinuzulu, was not even 
recognised by the South African government as the official leader 
of the Zulu. But he was supported by the greater part of his 
people, because they expected him to protect them against the 
white laws. Everywhere he came, he was treated as the king. The 
white government saw this and decided to make use of Solomon's 
influence by employing him as a mediator in certain conflicts 
with the Zulu population. 
This co-optation of Solomon fitted well into the framework 
of the "retribalisation policy", expounded by the South African 
government from the 1920s. The purpose of this policy was to 
keep the Africans together within their respective tribal 
boundaries under the authority of their Chiefs, so that it was 
easier for the white government to keep an eye on them. Part of 
the policy was to stimulate an ethnie consciousness among the 
blacks, for i f one was to feel oneself a member of a tribe, one 
had to be proud of the traditions and institutions of that tribe 
and of one's own nation. 
There were also black leaders, who, in the 1920s and 1930s, 
tried to use the central status of Solomon. They included George 
Champion, president of the Industrial and Commercial Worker's 
Union Yase Natal and John Dube, leader of the Christian black 
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elite, the kholwa, in Natal. These men associated themselves with 
the king to gain support from the Zulu population. They needed 
this support to strengthen their own position within the political 
structures of Natal. Dube was one of the founders of an 
organisation, Inkatha ya ka Zulu (1922), the purpose of which 
was to unite the Zulu round the central figure of king Solomon 
and, in connection with that, to revive the Zulu national 
consciousness.1 
It would seem that, in the first third of the twentieth 
Century, both black and white leaders had to work to promote 
ethnie consciousness, even among the Zulu, whose sense of 
nationhood was, prima facie, the strongest of all the African 
groups in South Africa. This would suggest that, by then, ethnie 
feeling even in this most solid of South African black nations 
was not strong and required resuscitation or perhaps even 
création. In this paper, I will discuss whether this low level of 
ethnicity has continued into the 1970s and 1980s and how 
political leaders, both black and white, have reacted to it. 
Ethnie policy 
The first thing to note is that the South African government 
never abandoned the ethnie policy. Nowadays it is called a 
"policy of separate development", which is characterised by 
Roelof Botha, Foreign Minister of South Africa, when he says: 
"The problem in Southern Africa is not one of race, but of 
nationalism... There is a white nationalism, and there are several 
black nationalisms".2 The government maintains that the blacks 
are divided into several ethnie groups (Tswana, North-Sotho, 
Ndebele, Tsonga, Venda, Swazi, South-Sotho, Zulu and Xhosa). 
Each group has an unchangeable culture and identity and 
therefore the government assigned each of them a "homeland", 
where they can go through their own development, at the end of 
which these homelands will become independent states. Needless 
to say, the so-called independent homelands are in reality very 
dépendent on South Africa. 
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It is true that one can distinguish several smaller ethnie 
groups in South Africa, but in contrast to the ideas of the white 
government, these are not closed groups with firm boundaries. 
They have a common cultural and linguistic legacy, since they are 
all speakers of closely related Bantu languages. There was and is 
regulär communication and interaction between them. The Chiefs 
of the past never did draw such clear boundaries. They conquered 
other groups, absorbed them and formed new ones. During the 
rise of Shaka, many groups fled to other territories and adopted 
the customs of local people. There never were insuperable ethnie 
différences between blacks. The ethnie policy of the white 
government changed this, because it stressed the minor 
différences that did exist. Obviously, this policy is not based on 
a thorough scientific study of the black people, but, as has 
become clear the last decades, rather serves certain economie and 
political purposes. 
Secondly, black leaders react roughly in two ways to the 
ethnie policy of the South African government. Some go the same 
way as Solomon and John Dube and stimulate ethnie nationalism. 
We wil l discuss one of them later. But there are also leaders who 
follow the route of black nationalism. They want to unite all 
blacks and indeed all South Africans, regardless of ethnie 
background, in the struggle against the apartheid regime. They 
believe that during this struggle, ethnie consciousness wil l 
become extinct. Some black nationalist organisations are multi-
racial (also including whites, coloureds and Indians), like the 
African National Congress (ANC) and the United Democratie 
Front (UDF). Other ones are for blacks only, like the Azanian 
People's Organisation (AZAPO) . 
Although black nationalism has existed for a long time past 
(the A N C was founded in 1912), it got an important impulse in 
the idea of Black Consciousness, which was framed for a large 
part by Steve Biko in the 1970s. Biko stated that the Blacks (by 
which he meant ail oppressed groups in South Africa, including 
Coloureds and Indians) had been subject to the most extreme 
forms of social, political and economie oppression for générations. 
The resuit was that the black man acquiesced in it; he became 
95 
Teun Baartman 
"an ox bearing the yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity". 3 
The thing to do was tö make him conscious of this and to let 
him see that he was not inferior to the white man. He could be 
proud of himself and of his cultural background. The ultimate 
goals of Black Consciousness are the libération of the black 
people and the achievement of Black Unity; "We are oppressed 
not as individuals, not as Zulus, Xhosas, Vendas or Indians. We 
are oppressed because we are black. We must use that very 
concept to unité ourselves and to respond as a cohesive group".4 
Black nationalist leaders oppose the policy of resettling 
blacks in homelands. According to them, the homelands are 
designed to boost the intertribal compétition and hostility and 
this distracts the blacks from what really matters, namely the 
struggle for black libération. The black leaders of homelands are 
heavily criticised, because they stimulate ethnie nationalisms. 
The best known homeland leader is Mangosuthu Gatsha 
Buthelezi, the prime minister of KwaZulu. Because he was always 
critical of the apartheid regime, he was seen as an important 
opponent of it. But that changed quickly as he began 
manipulating Zulu ethnie nationalism. In 1975 he established 
Inkatha yeNkululeko yeSiswe or the National Cultural Liberation 
Movement. The aims of this new Inkatha are, among others, to 
stimulate the cultural libération of the Africans and the abolition 
of racial discrimination, but also contacts with other cultural 
movements in Southern Africa with the purpose of establishing a 
common society and striving for African unity. The latter is 
repeatedly stressed by Buthelezi, especially at meetings where in 
addition to Zulu also other blacks are present. A t such meetings 
he déclares that all blacks are one people in one country and 
that black oppression has no ethnie boundaries. 
Despite all the talk about black unity, Inkatha appears to be 
established in particular to support the leading position of 
Buthelezi in KwaZulu . The exploitation of Zulu nationalism is a 
very useful means to this end. Buthelezi himself has a traditional 
background. He is chief of the Buthelezi and a nephew of king 
Solomon. He was an adviser to King Cyprian in the 1950s. In 
public, Buthelezi always seizes the chance to refer to this 
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Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of KwaZulu, 
President of Inkatha movement (photo by E . de K o m , (courtesy 
of A A B N ) 
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background. The Zulu nationalist attitude of Inkatha is evident in 
the name of the organisation and every meeting is accompanied 
by dances of Zulu warriors (impis) in füll traditional dress. 
According to Buthelezi there can be no reason for a Zulu to be 
ashamed of his ethnie background. It is clear that Inkatha 
stimulâtes ethnie feelings among the Zulu to gain their support. 
But, as we have seen, on the other hand it presents itself as a 
black nationalist movement.5 We wil l return to this (seeming?) 
contrast later. First we wil l have a look at the opinion of the 
black people about ethnie and black nationalism on the basis of a 
number of researches. 
Disappearing distinctions 
Research by Philip Mayer shows that in Soweto, where members 
of various black groups are living, ethnie distinctions are 
disappearing.6 In townships like Soweto, the South African 
government has implemented a policy of "ethnie grouping", 
according to which every group must live in its own part of the 
township. This policy exacerbâtes the rather explosive, violent 
situation in the townships and results in occasional fights 
between ethnie groups. Rules like this are counter-effective, 
because it makes the blacks conscious of their common African 
identity. A large proportion of the people in Soweto believe in 
the ideology of the melting-pot: all groups wil l melt into one 
African people. Ethnicity is rejected. Despite this rejection, 
ethnie feelings still play a small part in everyday life. Of ten 
people associate with members of their own group. But they do 
not do it because they think ethnie boundaries are important. 
They think that it is easier to do so because they speak the 
same language and have the same customs. In Soweto, black 
nationalism prevails over ethnie nationalism. 
M y next example is of migrant labourers, who form a large 
proportion of the black workers. Their attitude towards ethnicity 
has gone through a development in the last decades. William 
Beinart tells the story of M , a migrant labourer from Pondoland 7. 
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In 1940 M got his first job at the sugar estâtes in the east of 
Natal. Though there lived many Zulu in Natal, very few of them 
came to work at thèse estâtes, therefore most blacks who worked 
there were Pondo. According to M , "the Zulus felt that to go to 
the sugar cane fields was degrading"8. Obviously, there were 
ethnie patterns of migration: members of one group went, for 
example, to the sugar estâtes, but those of another group went 
to the mines. In this way, ethnicity was an important élément in 
the development of migrant organisations, like the indlavini. 
Thèse youth groups mixed older forms of ethnie organisation (e.g. 
initiation groups) with the new expériences of the compound. The 
indlavini did not have a local foundation. Their members were 
youngsters from ail over Pondoland. Although this broadened the 
basis of thèse networks, they stuck to the Mpondo-identity. They 
did not detribalise, but developed a new form of ethnicity. 
From 1941 to 1947, M worked in the mines. He worked 
underground, because the wages were higher and, above ail, 
because he could work there with his own people. Officially, 
underground teams were mixed, but in reality they were very 
often divided according to ethnie lines. In the compound itself, 
there were separate wings for every ethnie group and their 
members usually did not mix. There were even fights between 
them. M says that thèse were the resuit of the policy of the 
mines, but he also admits that the blacks were prejudiced against 
one another. So in the 1940s, ethnicity was still playing a rôle in 
the relations between migrant labourers. 
In the 1970s, Dunbar Moodie investigated the mine culture 
and his research shows that the picture has changed very much 9 . 
Underground, one notices very little of ethnie division. Because 
minework is dangerous, the workers have to co-operate very 
closely, so that accidents can be prevented as far as possible. 
This means that workers see themselves first of ail as a member 
of their work-team. They want good, trustworthy co-workers and 
are not particulary interested in the ethnie composition of their 
team. 
The mineworkers relax in several ways, playing sport, 
dancing, visiting prostitutes, drinking or taking drugs. This is 
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usually done in groups. There are home-boy groups, drinking 
groups, womanising groups and a lot of variations in between. 
These are some of the variations Moodie came across: a group of 
men, who had been in jail together; a group "who enjoyed flashy 
clothes and soul-talk"; a Xhosa-speaking group who talked about 
sports and politics in Transkei. It is evident that the workers 
form groups on the basis of shared interests and not because 
they have the same ethnie background. Most groups tend to be 
multi-ethnic. There is far less attention for ethnie relations in 
comparison to the 1940s. Other social relations have become more 
important. 
Finally, the decrease of ethnie sentiments among the black 
population is also evident from the increasing support for multi-
ethnic organisations, like the A N C , the U D F and the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the dwindling 
following of an ethnie Organization like Inkatha. The latter is 
especially evident in urban areas. A n opinion poll, held in 1985 
by Mark Orkin, showed that Buthelezi was supported by only 8% 
of the blacks, far less than the support of the A N C and the 
U D F . Even in the urban areas of Natal, where Zulu are in the 
majority, the following of Inkatha has decreased: from 80% in 
1978 to 33% in 1985. 1 0 
A large proportion of the South African blacks rejects ethnie 
identifies. Nevertheless, there are two points that need some 
considération. The first is that the rejection of ethnie 
nationalism does not have to mean that a unity wil l arise. Within 
the black group, there are a number of distinctions beside the 
ethnie one. There is the broad distinction between urban and 
rural blacks, each of which is divisible in several other 
catégories. Among the urban blacks are those who have a right 
of permanent résidence in the towns and those who are migrant 
labourers, lodged in barrack dormitories during their contracts. 
Among the rural blacks are those who have to travel (sometimes 
over great distances) from a homeland to their work in industrial 
centres and those who live in a homeland all their lives. Every 
category has different rights and a different status in a 
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hierarchy of which the urban blacks form the top and the 
homeland blacks the bottom. A i l thèse groups judge each other by 
material criteria and try to improve their own situation. In view 
of the very scarce possibilities in the South African context, this 
can lead to bitter fights, which sometimes seem to have an 
ethnie background, but are in fact fights over the few means of 
subsistence. 
The second point to be considered is the possibility of an 
alliance between ethnie and black nationalism. According to 
Buthelezi, it is the strategy of Inkatha to give the people an own 
identity first and then rouse them to fight the apartheid regime. 
He suggests this when he says: "If others have difficulty in the 
activities of Inkatha let them form their own inkathas... There is 
nothing to stop us from having a number of inkathas which can 
join together in a national movement towards libération". 1 1 This 
would mean that the contrast between striving for black unity 
and stimulating Zulu ethnicity would not be a contrast at ail. It 
seems that black nationalism and ethnie identities do not have to 
conflict. They can even go together in a process in which an 
ethnie identification can furnish a sensé of pride, while black 
nationalism mobilises people to the struggle against apartheid and, 
in so doing, unifies them. So, to see ethnie feelings as a 
weakening of black nationalism, would be to simplify the matter. 
In this view ethnie and black nationalism could be complementary 
to one another. 
A i l this would seem to give a more positive view on the 
activities of Inkatha. Still, there are a few remarks to make. 
First of ail, one must note that Inkatha is not as peace-loving as 
Buthelezi claims it to be. In spite of his Statements about non-
violent résistance, he uses very violent methods to eliminate 
opposition. This opposition cornes from multi-ethnic organisations, 
like the U D F , the A N C and C O S A T U . The last four years, there 
have been over 600 deaths in fights between members of Inkatha 
and the foliowing of U D F and C O S A T U . Both sides are using 
very cruel methods to ki l l their opponents. A t stake is the 
political power in Natal. Buthelezi has been leader of KwaZulu 
since 1975 and has considérable powers. His government keeps a 
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firm grip on the population in various ways. It controls black 
éducation, so that it càn force teachers to become members of 
Inkatha, before they can get a job. The same goes for students, 
before they can attend a school. Local Councils in KwaZulu are 
also controlled by Inkatha. Buthelezi is supported in all this by 
the white government, which cannot afford to lose the grip it 
has on the largest ethnie group to the A N C or the U D F . 
Buthelezi himself wants to use his power, as leader of KwaZulu 
and Inkatha, as a basis from which he can play a rôle in national 
politics in the near future. But at the moment, he is threatened 
in this by more radical organisations, which are gaining more and 
more support, especially in the urban areas. Buthelezi spends a 
lot of time and energy opposing U D F and C O S A T U and pays very 
little attention to résistance against the apartheid regime. Despite 
Buthelezi's statements about stimulating Zulu ethnicity while at 
the same time striving for black unity, it is obvious that one 
cannot expect an alliance between ethnie and black nationalism 
from the activities of Inkatha. 
Conclusions 
At the moment, there are no other groups in South Africa which 
can form such an alliance. Although the support for Buthelezi is 
decreasing, it is still large. And although ethnie identities are 
rejected by a large part of the South African blacks, there are 
still some ethnie sentiments left, as we have seen in Soweto. As 
long as these sentiments are cleverly manipulated by the white 
government and by black leaders like Buthelezi, and as long as 
ethnie and black nationalist movements are fiercely fighting each 
other, a united black nation wil l not arise. This is only possible 
when ethnie, multi-racial and black currents leave each other 
free to form their own groups and work together for black 
libération and the building up of a black South African state. In 
the process of doing so, ethnie nationalism wil l disappear and a 
new black nation will arise. There are examples of European 
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countries where the same kind of process has taken place. But 
the present-day circumstances in South Africa do not give much 
hope that such a thing wil l happen there soon. 
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